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1. INTRODUCTION 
Various scholars have confronted themselves with questions about gender. (De 
Beauvoir 1949, Irigaray 1977, Butler 1999,). There are and have been major 
discussions concerning the notion of "gender" most clearly represented by the 
creation of feminist movements.  This project aims at investigating the notion of 
"gender" and "sex" in order to try to understand what dynamics they cover. I have 
decided to scrutinize the notions from two different points of view:  
1) Social construction.  
and 
2) Essentialist standpoint.  
I want to take the question of "human nature" into consideration. This I will do by 
comparing the essentialist idea of human beings as possessing an inner core or innate 
characteristics to the social constructionist conviction that human beings are socially 
defined. This discussion I will seek to develop within the framework of a gender 
related discourse. The project will discuss the following questions: 
Is gender created through discourse? Is gender a social construction? And if this be 
the case, are the consequences that human beings are bound to live in bondage due to 
the fixation of identity in predetermined orders? 
Why is gender not natural? – Why are the arguments against an inner core/against 
naturalness so persistent? How do essentialism and social construction differ in their 
views of humanity, and do they, perhaps, share essential points? 
When treating questions of gender, a central issue seems to be naturalness versus 
performance. The core issue here is the tension between two opposites:  
A) Gender as an active, but unconscious, performance, which is forced upon us; a 
name and identity we come to accept when existing within a linguistic system 
that leaves no alternatives.  
B) Gender as something innate and natural; a certain feminine/masculine essence, 
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which makes me as a woman fundamentally different from masculine beings. 
Not because language named me and left me no choice, but because my nature, 
my inner core holds special feminine features. 
To relate to these questions and understand how they clash I have decided to draw on 
different thinkers and representatives of our social actuality: I will take my point of 
departure in Judith Butler's "Gender Trouble" where her performance theory seems to 
display itself most clearly. I am aware that her following works develop her ideas, 
and maybe even soften some of the theories from "Gender Trouble". However, I have 
decided to focus on “Gender Trouble” since this book specifically expounds the 
performance theory. Secondly, I am going to introduce Anne Fausto-Sterling and her 
impressive work on gender biology. Thirdly, I will introduce Diana Fuss and 
essentialism. Finally, having introduced the terms of the theoretical discussion I wish 
to relate it to what we can call a case story1 and thus discuss the correlation between 
gender, identity, and nature.  
 
2.0 METHOD AND METHODOLOGY 
The method I am applying is solely theoretical and implies no fieldwork. It consists 
of three central disciplines in academic work; reading, writing, and reflecting. One 
might argue that a project like this would benefit from fieldwork: Interviews about 
gender might have supplied me with informants' ideas of the notion and this might 
have enabled me to disclose certain social structures at work in random individuals. 
However, the choice of working with Joan Ørting is not a coincidence. My claim is 
that her position in the media reveals her as a social culture phenomenon which, in 
itself, is interesting to investigate. Ørting is often interviewed in television programs 
or talk shows about relationships, sex, gender roles, infidelity, love, attraction, and 
                                                 
1 The case story is a self-help book by Danish sexologist Joan Ørting. 
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even ethics. Lately she was in "Go' aften Danmark2" where she was interviewed 
about the fact that she has taken a lover in spite of her relationship to Carsten 
Islington, her partner. A simple search on Google ("Joan Ørting" in quotation marks) 
gives 67.900 hits.  My point is that she enjoys a certain status in the media, and is 
regarded as an expert concerning the above mentioned matters. By choosing to relate 
to her work, I relate to a representation of social values and beliefs shared by a broad 
variety of the Danish population.      
The project will consider Joan Ørting as an object of study, and a social cultural 
phenomenon. The means for studying this object will be the theoretical works of 
Judith Butler, Anne Fausto-Sterling, and Diana Fuss.  
The project aims at covering the dimensions of History and Culture and Philosophy. 
 
3.0 LANGUAGE 
 
The word became flesh.  
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,  
and the Word was God. (John 1:1, New Testament)  
 
When questioning the concept of gender, the analysis of discourse or language is 
often applied to disclose incorporated systems of power. 'Discourse' is Latin 
(Discurrere – to run to and from)3 – and the word means to talk, to discuss, to debate. 
However, the notion discourse has also developed into a term signifying a social 
frame constituting possibilities of human interaction. Discourse is thus related to 
power because the part who gets to define the discourse gains power of the situation. 
In fact, the part who defines the discourse, defines the way in which reality is 
perceived. Perceived reality is the keyword here; the ruler of discourse gains access 
                                                 
2 Danish Television program broadcasted on TV2; Danish commercial channel.  
3 The Concise English Dictionary 1984 
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to the establishment of the world-as-we-see-it. The idea is thus that discourse creates 
reality; the naming of an object is the realisation of the name. Within discourse 
analysis there is no objective world, nor any truth – there is only the winner of the 
discursive battle who sets the conditions for reality. 
Discourse analysis is founded in the works of Michel Foucault (among others), who 
puts it like this:  
Discourse is an entity of sequences of signs in that they are enouncements 
(enoncés) (Foucault 1969: 141).   
'Feminine' and 'masculine', or 'man' and 'woman' are four components in a spoken 
economy. They are, put in another way, four names. What is a name, then? A name is 
established through common consensus and by the conviction of all its associations it 
becomes an identity.   
As Denise Riley's title suggests, Am I That Name? is a question produced 
by the very possibility of the name's multiple significations. If one "is" a 
woman that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive (…)" 
(Butler 2007: 4) 
Woman - Am I that name?, and ultimately; am I that identity that the name seems to 
enforce on me? The problem is that by appointing approximately 50% of the world 
population as “women” one is "baptizing", so to speak, this group of individuals in 
the font of the patriarchal society. And this baptizing shows to be not only a random 
composition of letters - w-o-m-a-n - but also conveys a specific meaning which 
transforms the bearer of the name. Along with the 5 letters comes an identity; thus the 
naming is a process of fixing identity.  
For existential phenomenology, human beings are taken as free by virtue 
of being conscious/consciousness entailing the capacity to envisage 
alternatives to what currently is), and resources such as language are tools 
for thought rather than, primarily, constraints on it. 
This is not to say that people are fully able to exercise the liberty which 
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consciousness provides. Several authors within the existential-
phenomenological tradition, such as Hannah Arendt (1998), have stressed 
that social arrangements (both intersubjective ones and large-scale 
political structures) are required for the practical exercise of freedom. 
(Asworth, Qualitative Psychology, A Practical Guide to Research 
Methods: 12)  
Peter Asworth states that rather than being a constraint, language is a tool and a 
crucial help to navigate in a social context. The conscious mind is an ability of human 
beings, but having the ability of reflection doesn't necessarily mean that you apply it 
at all time. Therefore, the deconstruction of terms and concepts is of great 
importance. Hence, he argues that the existing language is a basic tool for social 
interaction; we just need to reflect on the bi-products or pre-understandings it entails. 
However, the ability to freely navigate in this forum is not a matter of course. Thus, 
the risk is that language might impose on people (and also help them impose on 
others) names that restrict possibilities of identity, freedom, and diversity. 
As the distributor of meaning, it consequently follows that language is powerful. 
 
4.0 THE IDEA OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
During my two years of university studies, both at KU and RUC, I have come to 
understand that, as everybody else, I am a social construction. In short, this means 
that, in cooperation with my surroundings, I build the one I am: I am a building 
project realised by the fusion of my own force and the force of the surrounding 
world, which is also in accordance with the agenda of Gender Trouble, treated in the 
next paragraph. The creation of identity is thus an achievement of common 
interaction. The emergence of identity happens in a space saturated with meaning 
between individuals; it is a teamwork affecting all participants.  
Joint action (cf. Scotter, 1993) simultaneously positions all the 
participants, both one self and the other person. The identities emerge in 
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the interaction – in the ‘in between space’. (Wetherell and Maybin; 1996; 
224) 
However, identity is not, as one might think, of free choice. Identity emerges within 
the culture in which the individual is born; a meaning-saturated environment. This 
entails that the individual has only restricted options, if any options at all. (E.g. could 
I ever succeed in understanding myself as a boy or do I have just one option: to 
undertake an identity as a girl?) Furthermore, social constructionists argue that a 
sense of the self repeats to construct itself throughout life: Identity is thus a project in 
progress. Though not free of choice, identity is changeable. 
Individual selves and mental processes arise in social context, and the 
‘content’ of thought and selfhood is to be understood in the light of 
meanings which are available within the culture in which the person 
immersed. Note also that, internalizing language, the child is not just 
internalizing a symbol system but the system of activity. The process of 
conversation is being internalized; symbols are part of interaction, or 
discourse. Second, the self is part of this. Having acquired the capacity to 
reflect on one’s own actions, one can build up a self-concept or identity. 
And the capacity for self-reflection develops through the reactions of 
other’s to the child’s behavior. (Ashworth: 17) 
This means that, from the moment it is born and confronted with the outside world, 
an infant is part of society, and from the very first moment relates to this world. This 
is a given premise. Without relating, the infant will die; it needs someone to feed it 
and take care of it. But from the moment of participation, the child is starts to adapt to 
the categorization of the social system. First, the child has no thought of itself as a 
being, but as it grows older and adapts to the social system, it takes in codes and 
language and creates a selfhood which is meaningful in the given culture. This is how 
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discourse is powerful4. It defines the choices of possibility within our range. To avoid 
the fixation of discourse the individual would have to reinvent the existing system. As 
it will soon follow, what some feminists suggest is an alternative to the existing 
system as it seems too narrow to meet the needs of the complexity and variety of 
human subjectivity. What is at stake for social constructionists is the question of how 
individuals come into being and form.  
In short, constructionists are concerned above all with the production and 
organization of differences, and they therefore reject the idea that any 
essential or natural givens precede the processes of social determination. 
(Fuss, 1989; 2-3)  
The central disagreement between social constructionist and essentialists is about the 
natural versus the social. This debate is exemplified by the question of gender – 
among others. (Also questions of race, culture, religion, and origins have divided 
social constructionists and essentialists). To a social constructionist the idea of 
something natural or original is itself a construction, and thus it follows that woman is 
a social production. When relating to the word or idea of woman as something natural 
that precedes history and human invention one is deceived. Social construction theory 
views bodies as a matter or a material to which a name and a meaning gets attached. 
Therefore one is not born a woman, but rather made one. 
 
4.1 JUDITH BUTLER 
Judith Butler, born 1956, is an American post-structuralist who is often thought to 
create strongly feministic theories, but who fails to regard herself as a feminist writer. 
Rather, she is a philosopher and a sociologist who has dealt with identity and 
subjectivity which has consequently led her to contribute to the field of feminism and 
queer theory. Judith Butler could rightly be introduced as a constructionist, something 
which her point of departure strongly entails: Gender identity is not an innate 
                                                 
4"Power" in French "pouvoir" = the ability to do something and therefore not necessarily negatively associated. 
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essence, but a dimension that is constructed in the interplay between individuals and 
social structures. Also the inner self-image, thoughts, debates, or voices are generated 
by discourse, which is why one is always in the midst of discourse and never escapes 
its closed system. However, this does not preclude changes of the norms of identity 
and society, but individuals always act within bounders constituted by superjacent 
discourse. Butler's theory of performativity explains the idea of gender as an act 
rather than an essence; a doing rather than a being. Consequently, gender is turned 
into a performance; instead of being a woman, you perform woman, and thereby 
enact the feminine role.  
Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within 
a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the 
appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. A political genealogy 
of gender ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive 
appearance of gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for 
those acts within the compulsory frames set by the various forces that 
police the social appearance of gender (Butler, 2007; 45) 
Gender is governed by a rigid legislation which continuously cements itself. What 
Butler hereby suggests is a historical tracing (a political genealogy) of the agreed-
upon concepts, which will ultimately disclose gender as a social and compulsory act.  
Butler stands out in her critique of the feminist movement whose method to obtain 
emancipation she does not support:  
Feminism critique ought also to understand how the category of 
“women”, the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very 
structures of power through which emancipation is sought. (Butler, 2007; 
4) 
The very word woman is problematic. When fighting for the emancipation of women 
one is relating to and also accepting the very label against which one is revolting. By 
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calling attention to the fact that one is woman, one also accepts the role one is given, 
and unconsciously honors the rules of the system one is trying to deconstruct. This 
means that the notion of “woman” is created within the system that suppresses her, 
and to put an end to this, the individual who is subjugated to this “womanhood” must 
be deprived of or rather emancipated from the title. If not, the system is once again 
cemented. Therefore, Butler argues, feminist critique needs to rethink and reinvent 
the concepts. By relating to the name given to her, she reinforces what she is trying to 
fight. To truly fight the binary oppositional linguistics, which places female in a less 
favored place, one needs to come up with totally new systems and categories of 
identification. Luce Irigaray is one who maybe succeeds in working her way around 
the issue without walking into the discursive trap. She argues that a new and all-
reforming system is needed because the existing one is inadequate. She might agree 
with the fact that people navigate according to pre-reflexive understandings, but even 
if we should get to a point of total elucidation, the categories would still fall short of 
covering what is needed for change to happen.  
In a new and further developed discursive system the tendency to be linguistically 
inattentive may be countered simply by offering a broader variety of stereotypes.  
The logic seems to be: more concepts to choose from = fewer meanings attached to 
single words = broader variety of categories = ultimately; higher level of complexity 
to cover human identity. 
 
(…) Luce Irigaray argues that women constitutes a paradox, if not a 
contradiction, within the discourse of identity itself. Women are the “sex” 
which is not “one”. Within a language pervasively masculinist, a 
phallogocentric language, women constitute the unrepresentable. In other 
words, women represent the sex that cannot be thought, a linguistic 
absence and opacity.  
… In opposition to Beauvoir, for whom women are designated as the 
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Other, Irigaray argues that both the subject and the Other are masculine 
mainstays of a closed phallogocentric signifying economy that achieves 
its totalizing goal through the exclusion of the feminine all together. 
(Butler, 2007; 13) 
This means that the phallogocentric system invented both the subject and the Other, 
so that individuals who do not qualify to enter masculinity since they don't have a 
phallus never got a chance to speak for themselves; they never got a chance to define 
but had to accept definition. Therefore, linguistically spoken, they do not exist. De 
Beauvoir interprets the system as a male dominated system which defines itself in 
opposition to something else; this “else” being female, while Irigaray argues that the 
dialectic mode of thinking is a mode which excludes alternatives: If the system is 
based on oppositions it means that the system is based on a “two-factor”-idea and De 
Beauvoir fails to see this. Her analysis is devised within a dialectic system (dia= 
greek = two). The binary system of signification offers only two categories to choose 
from; thus it is impossible to choose a third one - obviously. You cannot be, for 
instance, shemale or heminin. For better or for worse, you are man or woman – 
definitions decided by a male dominated society. Therefore Irigaray argues that 
women are a linguistic absence; they are not; they are not comprehensible; the 
system refuses the experience of female. 
  
4.2 ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING 
Anne Fausto-Sterling is a professor of biology and gender studies at Brown 
University in N.Y. She addresses issues of biology of gender, and consequently 
draws conclusions concerning gender and identity. She has suggested the use of 5 
sexes rather than 2 in her paper "The Five Sexes: Why male and female are not 
enough", but has met severe criticism from the group of people she supposedly aimed 
at helping; the so called intersexuals. Her point of departure is one of biological 
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interest but her findings also succeed in covering a social and interpretive aspect. 
This paragraph will add an aspect of biology to the subject matter. 
When a child is born, a new body enters the world. The body is inspected and 
subsequently categorized as either belonging to a boy or a girl. This categorization is 
performed by doctors, parents, and society unanimously. A body, sexless or 
multisexed, is an impossibility. Doctors will always aim at discovering the "real" or 
the "true" sex of a body even though it should be intersexual. When deciding the sex 
of a child, many doctors simply look at the body's ability of reproduction. This means 
that if a baby is born with a penis on the outside but oviducts, ovaries, and a uterus on 
the inside the child is declared to be female, and surgery will soon "correct" nature's 
mistake. The parents of the child are even told, very often, that such deviations are 
very rare, and that there is no one to talk to with the same experience. Hence, soon 
the intersexual body will be "corrected" and turned into one of the two "real" sexes so 
that it won't confuse or challenge our notion of sexuality. This kind of body seems 
almost heretical to the religion of The Two Sexes because it weakens the idea of 
sexual difference. However, intersexuality is much more common than expected. For 
each 100 live births there is an estimated frequency of 1.7285 of them being children 
born with what is called Nondimorphic Sexual Development. Nondimorphic Sexual 
Development covers the Turner Syndrome6, Klinefelter Syndrome7, true 
hermaphrodites, Androgyn Insensitivity Syndrome8 (AIS) among others.  The 
frequency of Nondimorphic Sexual Development is much more common than for 
instance the occurrence of albinos.9 Read the following comment by Anne Fausto-
Sterling on the concept of sex and gender:  
                                                 
5 The figure is from Fausto-Sterling's book "Sexing the body." 
6 Females lacking a second X chromosome. 
7 Males having an extra X chromosome. 
8 Genetically inherited change in the cell surface receptor for testosterone, i.e. children born with a highly feminized 
genitalia. The body is "blind" to the presence of testosterone, and at puberty these children develop breasts and a 
feminine bodyshape if not treated. 
9 Anne Fausto-Sterling, 2000; 52-53. 
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A body's sex is simply too complex. There is no either/or. Rather, there 
are shades of difference. (…)One of the major claims I make in this book 
is that labelling someone a man or a woman is a social decision. We may 
use scientific knowledge to help us make the decision, but only our 
beliefs about gender – not science – can define our sex. Furthermore, our 
beliefs about gender affect what kinds of knowledge scientists produce 
about sex in the first place. (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; 3) 
Should the world ever reach this acknowledgement it would mean a revolution of 
society as we know it. The system based upon a binary dialectical economy with an 
inclination to a simple two-factor model (feminine/masculine) would fall apart. We 
would have to change our view of sexuality and gender, and an opening towards a 
multisexed society would be inevitable. We would no longer have two "real" sexes 
but multiple. This would mean a world of difference, literally, to identity and social 
constitution.  
 
5.0 ESSENTIALISM 
Some years ago Plato was presented to me, and I studied his allegory of the cave with 
some scepticism: Behind the dancing shadows on the wall there were true, ideal 
forms and figures that apparently shaped our idea of what we saw distorted on the 
wall. This point of view is called idealism. Essentialism is the ontological position 
that any kind of entity has certain characteristics or underlying ideas, and it is closely 
related to Platonic idealism. As entailed in the word, essentialism believes everything 
to hold a core or an essence10.  
Essentialism is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true 
essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the 
"whatness" of a given entity. (Fuss, 1989; xii) 
                                                 
10 Essence, lat. =essentia = essence/being/nature. 
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Essentialism takes the standpoint opposite of social constructionist theory. Due to the 
limitations of human activity and identity it induces, essentialism has been severely 
criticised. (Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre among many others.). Never the less, it is still 
widely believed that men and women hold certain characteristics that define them as 
individuals and are core qualities to their gender. Women, for instance, might be 
regarded as more fragile, moody, beautiful, weak etc. than men due to their sex.  
In 4.0 I shortly outline social construction theory. The first encounter with social 
construction as a theory might be a moment of contradictory feelings: On the one 
hand it liberates us from the narrow ideas and associations of our sexes with which 
some people do not feel at ease. On the other hand it might provoke a feeling of 
powerlessness: As mere bodies we seem to come here empty handed, unwillingly 
subjugated to the production of discourse, not holding any personal or innate 
qualities. It seemed to me that social construction had gained monopoly on the 
explanation of human identity, and that alternative approaches to identity-issues 
were, and still are, regarded as naïve, if not unintelligent. If you were to ask questions 
about the "essence" of human beings, or considered a term such as "human nature", 
obviously, you were on the wrong track. I include my own thoughts on the matter 
because I wish to draw attention to the fact that essentialism is somehow disdained 
and abandoned in the academic field. I find this problematic for various reasons 
which will appear in paragraph 5.1.    
 
5.1 DIANA FUSS 
If we are to intervene effectively in the impasse created by 
essentialist/constructionist divide, it might be necessary to begin 
questioning the constructionist assumption that nature and fixity go 
together (naturally) just as sociality and change go together (naturally). 
(Fuss, 1989; 6)  
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For a long time essentialism and social construction have defined themselves in 
oppositions to each other. To exemplify, they highly disagree whether an individual 
is born female or is made female. Diane Fuss, declaring herself an anti-essentialist, 
lists a few problems concerning the theory of social construction. She points out the 
fact that the weaknesses of essentialism have been profoundly described, but that 
little attention has been paid to the presumptions of social construction.  
What Fuss suggests is that social construction has come to terms with itself. The 
rejection of a core or essence is in itself an essentialist statement about the nature that 
does not exist; it is just a negating statement. There is no difference between insisting 
on an essence and insisting on no essence when it comes to questions of ultimate 
truths. It is an either/or question, and both sides happen to say something about 
human nature as either constructional or innate. 
This book will make the claim that there is no essence to essentialism, 
that (historically, philosophically, and politically) we can only speak of 
essentialisms. Correlatively, it will also make the claim that 
constructionism (the position that differences are constructed, not innate) 
really operates as a more sophisticated form of essentialism. The bar 
between essentialism and constructionism is by no means as solid and 
unassailable as advocates of both sides assume it to be. (Fuss, 1989; xii) 
Instead Fuss introduces an alternative idea; the usage of essentialism as a deliberate 
risk. By willingly risking essentialism one evades the paraphrasing of a social 
mechanism to a universal truth with unlimited power. By consciously embracing 
essentialism one disarms and un-powers the mechanism of essentialism.  
In feminist theory, the idea that men and women, for example, are 
identified as such on the basis of transhistorical, eternal, immutable 
essences has been unequivocally rejected by mani anti-essentialists 
poststructuralist feminists concerned with resisting any attempts to 
naturalize human nature. (…) And yet one can also hear echoing from the 
 16
corners of the debates on essentialism renewed interest in its possibilities 
and potential usages, sounds which articulate themselves most often in the 
form of calls to "risk" or to "dare" essentialism." (Fuss, 1989; xii.) 
What Fuss suggests is that the battle between hardcore essentialists and social 
constructionists is a battle of little importance. They stem from the same discursive 
roots. She declares herself anti-essentialist and takes flight in a plural form of 
essentialism, essentialisms, implying that the plural form avoids the idea of a 
universal essence. Rather, one should analyse historical, political and philosophical 
contexts as products of different essentialisms; essentialism still remaining the 
fundament of our structure of thought. A pure social constructionism is self-
contradictory because a totalitarian rejection is based on essentialist logic.  
(…) as I now hope to show, the very staking out of a pure anti-essentialist 
position simply reinscribes inescapable essentialist logic. (Fuss, 1989; 9) 
This is the theoretical main reason why a simple rejection of essentialism is 
problematic. It proves to "be sleeping with the enemy" by engaging in the same line 
of thought. The following paragraph will treat a purely essentialist point of view to 
consider where this standpoint might take us. 
 
5.2 CASE STORY : JOAN ØRTING 
Joan Ørting is a Danish sexologist who has received public attention through her 
status as a national specialist in matters of sex and relationship. The term 'sexologist' 
is not a protected title and has not authorisation. This means that no qualifications are 
needed to call oneself sexologist though a lot of private schools exist who aim at 
educating their students as therapists. When considering the statements made by Joan 
Ørting one should therefore keep in mind that Ørting is not considered an informed 
writer theoretically, and she does not constitute a theoretical point of departure in this 
project, but rather a source who expresses contemporary social constructions. My 
purpose is to regard her as a cultural phenomenon, not as a scholar. 
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Ørting has had both an offensive and a provocative effect on many people which 
might be one of the reasons for the massive public attention. She represents a double 
standpoint since, on the one hand, she expresses a deeply conservative gender view, 
and, on the other hand, she has come to represent sexual liberation for both sexes.  
Ørting is concerned with the distribution of feminine and masculine roles, and 
maintains that the duality between the sexes is a necessity. She assails the subject 
matter from an essentialist point of departure, clearly stating that human beings hold 
either masculine or feminine essences which define our character, personality, 
abilities, and also relational problems. Ørting's recent book "Ta' mig" (Do me) will 
serve as study case. This is from the first chapter:  
Typically men! Most women have at some point exclaimed this, and even 
though it is a generalisation, there is something right about it. Men and 
women have a long line of characteristics which are especially attached to 
the sex we are. I call them essences. All human beings contain masculine 
and feminine essence. Usually, women contain more feminine essence 
than men just as men usually contain more masculine essence than 
women. But both men and women also hold the essence of the opposite 
sex within them, and this helps us to become whole beings. (Ørting, 2007; 
p.11)   
The quote clearly outlines that men and women belong to different groups and share 
certain characteristics with members of the same club of woman/manhood. The world 
is designed as a polar reality, and tension is created between two poles; not five, 16 or 
more. In other words, Ørting analyses social contexts through a gendered point of 
view. Her interpretation of subjects in contemporary society is in line with 
heterosexual hegemony; norms and values of a straight society is institutionalized and 
imposed on subjects. Ørting voices the idea that reality is a fixed entity based on pairs 
of binary oppositions where the central dualism of her field is the male/female 
polarization. Her book functions as an extended analysis of this discourse, and is a 
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self-help book to all subjects who fall victims of this discourse. Consider the 
following quote from Butler's Gender Trouble: 
If there is a positive normative task in Gender Trouble, it is to insist upon 
the extension of this legitimacy to bodies that have been regarded as false, 
unreal, and unintelligible. Drag is an example that is meant to establish 
that "reality" is not as fixed as we generally assume it to be. The purpose 
of the example is to expose the tenuousness of gender "reality" in order to 
counter the violence performed by gender norms. (Judith Butler, 2007; 
xxv) 
J. Butler hereby claims that her aim is to insist on 'no naturalness' or, alternatively, 
'equal naturalness'. Drag is a performance no less natural than the performance of 
heterosexuality, and to "do drag" is implicitly the act of exposing a consistent 
falseness of (especially) gender constructions.  
Let us compare the idea of identity constructions with the following quote describing 
feminine essence. According to Ørting, we all hold aspects of both essences, but 
obviously the feminine essence is the mark of womanhood: 
Women can be compared to a vast ocean which roars and moves. One 
minute it is quiet and peaceful, the next in turmoil. An ocean has no 
direction or goal; it is not going anywhere but moves back and forth all 
day long. The emotional life of a woman could be compared to the 
alternating movements of an ocean. Her mood changes many times a day, 
and one is never sure what one will meet when one stands in front of her. 
(…) The feminine essence represents the body, and the more expressive a 
woman is purely physically, the more appealing she will appear to the 
opposite sex. (…) Relationship, family, and love are at the top of her list 
of what is important in life, and her fundamental fear is to be rejected and 
lose love. (…) Women with a very feminine essence find it problematic to 
put action behind their ideas. They easily daydream about going to 
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Hawaii, dancing on the beach, meeting exciting guys from all over the 
world and just be body. But if the dreams are supposed to be realised the 
woman's masculine part has to be called into action. (Ørting, 2007; 11-13) 
Ørting continues to describe feminine essence in traditional terms. "Woman" is 
always portrayed as passive, receiving, confused, and in the power of her emotions. 
This is if she purely consists of feminine essence. Luckily, she also holds masculine 
features, which enables her to rise from the level of childhood and unpredictability to 
a level of responsibility, reliability, and action. There is a huge danger and possibly 
suppression involved in this simplification. The reader is seduced to believe in a 
gendered world view which qualifies men to establish a secure and structured world, 
which, ultimately, is a safe playground for women and children. What we see is a 
tendency to construct female identities with constraints. A woman, (with purely 
'feminine essence') is reduced to a spoiled child; she is unpredictable, unreliable, and 
unjust. The parenthesis above should establish some kind of escape from a total 
suppression of women: Yes, there is still room for her to be rational, determined, and 
trustworthy, but only if she applies her masculine qualities. Is the parenthesis even 
worthy of mentioning? Does it truly establish an escape for women into the adult 
world? Even though Ørting makes it clear that a woman also holds masculine 
qualities, the essential feminine features are emotionality and body. There is an equal 
sign between 'feminine essence' and emotion. Thus, this is, first and foremost, what a 
woman consists of. On the other hand, there is a clear link between men and 
rationality, ability, and goal-focused determination. Is this tendency to let gender be a 
mark of qualification one of the reasons why we still witness a masculine majority 
filling key positions in society? Do women fail to consider themselves academically 
and rationally equal to men, and does society as a whole indulge in regarding women 
as unstable, emotional, and thus unqualified to fill key positions?  According to social 
constructionists gender is a mere product of discourse, a part of a made-up reality 
conditioned by the strongest discourse participant. Thus "essence" is nothing but an 
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idea we relate to and hence empower. To be a typical man has no objective meaning 
but only makes sense in a shared discourse. Beyond this knowing discourse the 
typical man would lose his significance all together. It follows that the idea of a pole-
based reality is equally constructed. But before we reject Ørting and her gender 
constructions all together, we might consider that, knowingly or unknowingly, she 
has a deeper meaning. Ørting could be considered as 'risking' essentialism for a 
reason and thus translate reality into a comprehensible world. She might be said to 
take the consequence of years of dialectic discourse and surrender to status quo 
deliberately to ease living within the boundaries put up by discourse. Furthermore, 
her point might not only be to ease living, but even make it more dynamic and 
enjoyable; as every child knows, the game is only good fun if rules are obeyed and 
limits set up. The basic statement of "Do me" might be reduced to: enjoy your 
symptoms! Enjoy your symptoms of the sickening essentialism lying as the 
fundamental disease of every human society.  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
1) On a higher level this project seeks to discuss essence and construction as two 
fundamentally different ways to analyse reality. It has been made clear that an 
unequivocal choice between the two points of view is problematic. As it is clear to 
many of us, male and female subjectivities (often) express themselves differently; we 
think, act, and react differently. The question is: does nature call forth this behaviour 
or is it caused by the fierce impact of discourse? It is the firm conviction of social 
constructionists that gender is socially constructed and realised through discourse. To 
essentialists, the opposite case is in force. It is my conviction that language, culture, 
reproduction, and discourse shape the notion of gender. However, I do not reject the 
idea of an existential essence. This is a mere question of conviction and each reader 
will construct a preferred model of analysis. 
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This project has dealt with various interpretations of reality and subjectivity; various 
interpretations of "the space of possibilities". I refer to reality as 'a space of 
possibilities' to give it a hint of infinity since reality could be regarded as an entity of 
shapelessness put into form. I think the need to construct and limit reality is 
characteristic for conscience existence. On an abstract level there is a need to reach 
out and touch something which is not just empty air; on a more concrete level we 
have a basic instinct of imitation and also limitation. When sending subjectivity into 
space we need it to bounce at something and return to us, and for this to be possible 
there is a need for concepts to constitute and give form to a reality of shapelessness. 
In other words; there is a crucial need for analysis for us to be able to enter and 
comprehend existence. 
I have introduced Judith Butler, and followed her line of thought in this project; 
subjectivity and identity are social constructions in an environment saturated with 
meaning which appear to participants to be based on fixed and universal laws. On the 
basis of this idea, reality is thought to cover universal structures which empower the 
idea of natural genders and fixed sexualities. Judith Butler speaks of a congealed 
reality where concepts become impossible to debate since they continue to confirm. 
However, this seems to be an interpretation short of imagination. Subsequently, I 
have introduced Anne Fausto-Sterling, a gender biologist, who maintains that a 
body's sex is too complex to determine within existing terminology, which offers 
either a male or a female body. Rather, it seems that bodies tend to take a direction 
towards a male or a female solution, but the biological reality of bodies is much more 
complex, and makes it impossible to declare single-sexedness. A body will always 
hold features pointing in 'both' directions (hereby implying that there are only two 
directions to choose from). Anne Fausto-Sterling clearly states that gender identity is 
a social decision, and the title of her book "Sexing The Body" implies that an act is 
performed onto the body itself. In this way, I have thoroughly treated the idea of a 
socially constructed gender. However, it was also my intention to introduce another 
 22
interpretation of reality; the essentialist interpretation. This point of view was 
commented on and made clear by Diane Fuss; anti-essentialist, pro-essentialisms, and 
thereafter exemplified by sexologist Joan Ørting, who put into words how men and 
women are essentially different. Joan Ørting works inside the walls of the 
phallogocentric world. The individuals that she helps to overcome their relational 
problems are equally products of an existing economy, and therefore find use of her 
advice – developed to suit the demands of the constituted world. However – as I see 
it, her agenda is not really a sexist one, or an agenda suppressing the female subject 
deliberately. Indeed, she works inside the boundaries of a cultural actuality, and she 
does not seem to contemplate the consequences of reinforcing it, but is she 
contributing to the suppression of female subjects? Ørting is a powerful participant of 
social discourse and many women read her books. Many women also take good 
advice from her self-help analysis. Do readers finish the book with a changed 
subjectivity? Surely. The upper layers of subjectivity are changed and negotiated all 
the time, our brain is changed even from a train ride. But does she succeed in 
changing or influencing something of fundamental importance and does it prove to be 
suppressing? Certainly, Ørting's aim is less ambitious than the one presented by 
feminist writers and critics such as Irigaray; she is not trying to make us exit reality 
or reinvent it. What Ørting offers is a solution to modern relationships that have gone 
wrong. And since we cannot escape constituted binary reality (however we discuss 
the possibilities), of course the solution to the binary-oppositional relationship is 
based in the same field in which the relationship itself has emerged. By embracing 
the distribution of roles, we enhance the dynamics within a couple relationship, and 
in this sense, it is of little importance who gets to play the female part and who gets to 
be masculine as long as we maintain the tension between the two poles.  
I regard Joan Ørting as giving advice, practical and ready-to-use advice, to 
individuals finding themselves subjects to a dialectic system. Her aim is not to make 
us exit this reality but rather to enable us to navigate within it and, preferably, enjoy 
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it. However, many individuals fail to suit this binary reality. And what do they do? 
Do they still enjoy our shared symptoms? I doubt it. As being “queer”, being 
“intersexual” or being something completely else, one still needs to make room for a 
subjectivity that does not fit in. Joan Ørting might offer support to those who fall 
victims of a binary reality and knowingly or unknowingly accept its restrictions, but 
she offers no help, what so ever, to individuals for whom multiplicity and diversity 
are of crucial importance. Such individuals are forced to fit a gendered system, 
enclosed as subjects of genitals. Genitals are made to matter. Genitals are made to 
matter to someone who does not accept their existence as influential to identity.  
This project does not seek to conclude whether each individual takes damage from 
reading sexual self-help books but rather wishes to raise the question. Does Joan 
Ørting contribute to the reinforcement of a suppressing system, or is she helping 
individuals subjugated to a powerful discourse to interpret their roles in the play? 
Let us try to imagine reality as a text, however far fetched it might seem: 
Imagine that you have to read an extremely difficult text. It contains concept after 
concept that you have never heard of before; the words and signs in front of you are a 
matrix of senselessness. The access to this kind of text is facilitated by structure and 
codes which will enable the reader to comprehend it. A teacher or a lecturer might 
give her/his students various codes or keywords to help them structure and analyze 
the text of the day. If reality is the most complex text we will ever come across there 
is a need for structuring, coding, and simplifying it to make it comprehensible. 
Therefore, one is easily seduced to choose the simplest analysis available, but as 
Albert Einstein says "Make everything as simple as possible, but not any simpler". 
The danger of simplification is that one fails to see what is actually also there. We 
might all agree that language serves as a toolbox without which it would be 
impossible to navigate. We do not escape language; language is what we do. But 
language is also a risk, so to speak, because in the discursive negotiation of power, 
you either define or get to be defined - equivalent to the law of the jungle.   
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Constructions of gender identities become a system of navigation; they put into form 
something which has an infinity of forms. And this is damn sexy - to a majority of 
readers. In a plain binary reality we are taught that “women” are naturally appealing 
to “men”, and vice versa, but the so called ‘natural attraction’ is challenged by 
‘divergent subjects’. Simplicity is appealing as always before, and gender solutions 
are based on an attractive simplicity and sexual difference.  
They are sexy constructions. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
Sexy Constructions is a project that treats the notion of gender. It seeks to investigate 
the tension created between two poles: the idea of a socially constructed gender and 
the idea of one based on essence. The project introduces theories by Judith Butler, 
Anne-Fausto Sterling, and Diana Fuss which all represent an anti-essentialist 
standpoint. As an object of analysis, the project scrutinizes the book "Ta' Mig" by 
Danish sexologist Joan Ørting. She offers advice to modern relationships, and 
analyses gender relations from an essentialist point of departure. 
 
